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INTRODUCTION

In recent years, government employment has provided the law
school graduate with a legal apprenticeship more common to an ear
lier era. Although such practical experience is advantageous, there
are some unseen aspects of government employment that should be
considered by the neophyte lawyer. The lawyer entering govern
ment service should look not only to the present but also to the fu
ture, when he will be entering or reentering private practice. The
purpose of this article is to explore the ethical considerations facing
the government lawyer about to enter private practice. Similar con
siderations apply to the new lawyer presently contemplating govern
ment service. Particular attention will be given to the conflicting
public policies that arise whenever courts consider the ethical
problems encountered by a government lawyer entering private
practice. The article then will examine the approaches frequently
employed to maintain a balance between these conflicting policies. l
The undercurrent in this area is one in which ethical standards
• Assistant Attorney General for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts; B.A.,
Eastern Nazarene College, 1975, J.D., Suffolk University Law School, 1979. This article
represents the opinions and legal conclusions of its author and does not necessarily repre
sent opinions or legal conclusions of the Department of the Attorney General. Opinions
of the Attorney General are formal documents rendered pursuant to specific statutory
authority.
1. Armstrong v. McAlpin, 606 F.2d 28, 32 (2d Cir. 1979), vacated en hanc, 625 F.2d
433 (2d Cir. 1980), vacated on other groundr mem., 101 S. Ct. 911 (1981) ("[t]he formula
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generally applicable to the private attorney also regulate the govern
ment lawyer. Additionally, the federal lawyer is a representative of
the federal government, the composite of the people, and thus has an
even greater responsibility.2 The government lawyer rises from his
obligation to the bar ultimately to constitute a symbol of government
itself. The government attorney, in addition to being a symbol of
government, also is charged with the awesome responsibility of
maintaining the integrity of government bodies. 3 That responsibility
must not be taken lightly, as it forms the ethical foundation of the
government from which the moral fabric of our society is partially
sewn. No government, however, is capable of defining the limits of
right and wrong conduct. The terms are relative to the particular
context of historical movement and the meanings shift as the subjec
tive needs of the individual and the objective needs of society
evolve. 4 In more practical terms, the government attorney must
work within the ethical framework of justice and reflect the ethical
conscience of society. Nevertheless, government service also pro
vides the attorney with the unique opportunity to be an instrument
of constructive change. 5
Before considering the detailed ethical problems, it also is im
portant to remember that ethical rules are largely a function of his
torical developments and changing social mores. Thus, ethical
standards should not be etched in stone. Rather, ethical standards
should remain flexible so that they can conform to prevailing societal
values. 6

tion of standards concerning the future employment of government attorneys involves a
careful weighing of competing concerns").
,
2. Fahy, Special Ethical Prohlems ofCounselfor the Government, 33 FED. B.J. 331,
332 (1974).
3. Kaplan, Forhidden Retainers, 31 N.Y.U. L. REV. 914, 920 (1956) (faith of the
general public in the integrity of government bodies is essential).
4. F. HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF MIND: BEING PART THREE OF THE ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF THE PHILOSOPHICAL SCIENCES §§ 488-552 (1830).
5. Comment, Conjiictsof Interest and the Former Government Attorney, 65 GEO.
L.J. 1025, 1025-26 (1977) (stability of government depends upon public confidence in the
justice system which attorneys inspire through strict adherence to high ethical principles).
6. General Motors Corp. v. City of New York, 501 F.2d 639, 649 (2d Cir. 1974)
(standards of Canon 9 of the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility as to what creates
an appearance of evil is largely a question of current ethical legal mores); O. HOLMES,
The Bar As A Profession, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 156 (1920). See generally Note,

Unchanging Rules in Changing Times: The Canons ofEthics and Intra-Firm Conflicts of
Interests, 73 YALE L.J. 1058 (1964).
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PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY CONSIDERATIONS

The standards reflecting current thought on ethical problems
are found in the American Bar Association (ABA) Code of Profes
sional Responsibility (the Code). The structure of the Code is com
prised of canons, which are axiomatic norms; ethical considerations
(EC's), which are aspirational in nature; and disciplinary rules
(DR's), which are mandatory.7 This conceptual framework illus
trates the essential thrust of the Code: The drafters, recognizing the
difficulty in formulating concrete ethical rules, provided both general
statements of conduct and aspirational guidelines. Conversely, the
drafters, cognizant of the need for minimum standards, designed cer
tain mandatory rules. The interplay within this system gives the
lawyer sufficient room to exercise his professional judgment without
undue fear of violating the Code. Generally, the Code is given great
weight by the courts8 and is fully applicable to government lawyers. 9
A. lJR 9-101(B)

DR 9-101(B), the most relevant section of the Code concerning
the former government lawyer, provides that "a lawyer shall not ac
cept private employment in a matter in which he had substantial re
7. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Preamble (1980). The American
Bar Association currently is circulating for comment the ABA MODEL RULES OF PRO
FESSIONAL CONDUCT (Discussion Draft, Jan. 30, 1980). Where appropriate, citations to
the proposed rule and comment will be given if the proposed rule constitutes a variation
from the Code.
8. Woods v. Covington County Bank, 537 F.2d 804, 810 (5th Cir. 1976) (Code
carries great weight in court's examination of attorney's conduct); City of Cleveland v.
Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co., 440 F. Supp. 193, 206 (N.D. Ohio) (judicial notice
taken of the standards of professional conduct proclaimed in the Code), affd, 570 F.2d
123 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 996 (1978). But see Silver Chrysler Plymouth,
Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 518 F.2d 751, 756-57 (2d Cir. 1975) (no need to distinguish
between partners and associates on the basis of title alone as both are bound by the same
Code of Professional Responsibility) (overruled on the question of appealability by Arm
strong v. McAlpin, 625 F.2d 433 (2d Cir. 1980) (en banc), vacated and remanded mem.,
101 S. Ct. 911 (1981) and Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 101 S. Ct. 669 (1981».
9. Jordan, Ethical Issues Arising From Present or Past Government Service, in PRO
FESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 171, 172 (1978) (suggesting the Code may apply to both
purely private matters and matters connected with government service since problems of
confiicting interests, of switching sides, of abuse of client confidences, and of appearances
of impropriety exist in the private as well as in the public context).
The Model Rules contain a "Government Lawyer Confiict of Interest" section as
well as a reference to "the legal department of a government agency" within the defini
tion of "law firm." ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.11 (Discus
sion Draft, Jan. 30, 1980). The comments to this section explicitly state that the
government lawyer is subject to the Rules of Professional Conduct. Id. Definitions.
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sponsibility while he was a public employee."lo The applicable rule
under the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Model Rules)
is termed differently but substantially is similar in meaning to DR 9
IOI(B).1I
The complexity of problems that DR 9-IOI(B) creates for the
government attorney and the difficulties confronting a court in
resolving ethical issues under DR 9-101(B) are compounded by the
presence of strongly conflicting public policies. A strict disqualifica
tion standard under DR 9-IOI(B) will both deny the client his choice
of counsel and impair the government's ability to attract qualified
attorneys by imposing an overbroad restriction upon former govern
ment lawyers entering private practice. The public undoubtedly will
suffer if qualified attorneys are dissuaded from public service by the
imposition of a rigid and overbroad disqualification standard under
DR 9-IOI(B).12 These considerations, therefore, implicate strong
public policies concerning both the availability of professional serv
ices and competence in government. 13 Balanced against these poli
cies is the interest in preventing, through the enforcement of DR 9
IOI(B), the government attorney from "wield[ing] Government
power with a view toward subsequent private gain."14 In light of
these conflicting public policies, an attempt to formulate a rule of
general application regarding disqualification under DR 9-IOI(B) is
inappropriate}S Instead, "[t]he formulation of standards concerning
the future employment of government attorneys involves a careful
weighing of competing concerns."16
10. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 9-IOI(B) (1980).
II. "A lawyer shall not represent a private client in connection with a matter in
which the lawyer participated personally and substantially as a public officer or em
ployee." Id. Rule l.ll(a). The major difference between DR 9-IOI(B) and Rule l.ll(a)
is the "participated personally" language in the new rule. Id. This language effectively
narrows the rule to matters in which the government lawyer was directly involved and
eliminates the problem of outright disqualification of an entire department.
12. Kaufman, The Former Government Attorney and tne Canons ofProfeSSional Etn
ics, 70 HARV. L. REV. 657, 668 (1957). Judge Kaufman suggests that the government, as
a former client, must be protected. If the restrictions, however, are too broad, profes
sional sterilization will develop, ultimately discouraging government service.
13. Armstrong v. McAlpin, 606 F.2d 28, 32 (2d Cir. 1979), vacated en hanc, 625
F.2d 433 (2d Cir. 1980), vacated on otner grounds and remanded mem., 101 S. Ct. 91l
(1981).
14. General Motors Corp. v. City of New York, 501 F.2d 639, 650 n.20 (2d Cir.
1974).
15. Armstrong v. McAlpin, 606 F.2d 28, 33 (2d Cir. 1979), vacated en hanc, 625
F.2d 433 (2d Cir. 1980), vacated on otner grounds and remanded mem., 101 S. Ct. 91l
(1981).
16. Id. at 32.
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Realizing the necessity to strike a balance between the policy of
preventing abuse of government employment on the one hand and
the public interest in attracting qualified attorneys for government
service and preserving a client's choice of counsel on the other, the
courts have applied DR 9-101(B) only after careful and thorough
consideration of all the facts and circumstances of the case. For ex
ample, in Telos, Inc. v. Hawaiian Telephone CO.,17 the court was
faced with a motion to disqualify an attorney from representing an
interconnect company that was suing a telephone company for anti
trust violations. IS The court noted that plaintiff's attorney, a former
deputy attorney general for the State of Hawaii, previously had been
involved in a state action against the telephone company for anti
trust violations.l 9 The court, however, did not automatically dis
qualify the attorney. Instead, the court made a painstaking
examination of the memoranda and affidavits from both actions and
concluded that the present action paralleled the earlier state action.20
The importance of Telos lies in the careful analysis made by the
court. Implicit in the court's decision was a recognition of the com
peting policy considerations of ensuring ethical conduct on the part
of lawyers, on one hand, and the litigant's right to freely chosen
counsel on the other. This recognition is a necessary step in making
the Code work. 21 In addition, a balancing approach will sharpen the
focus of the problem and point to the solution. 22
Many of the solutions proposed to reconcile the inherent con
flicts underlying disqualification of an attorney under DR 9-101(B)
17. 397 F. Supp. 1314 (D. Hawaii 1975).
18. /d. at 1315.
19. Id. at 1316.
20. Id. at 1315-16.
21. Woods v. Covington County Bank, 537 F.2d 804, 813 (5th Cir. 1976) (the more
frequently litigant is delayed or disadvantaged by disqualification of his lawyer under the
appearance of impropriety doctrine, the greater the likelihood of public suspicion). See
also Fund of Funds, Ltd. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 567 F.2d 225, 227 (2d Cir. 1977)
(painstaking analysis of facts and precedents necessary); City of Cleveland v. Cleveland
Elec. Illuminating Co., 440 F. Supp. 193, 196 (N.D. Ohio) (ethical problems cannot be
resolved in the abstract and decisions require a thorough consideration of the facts), aJid,
570 F.2d 123 (6th Cir. 1977), cerro denied, 435 U.S. 996 (1978).
22. Note, Attorney's Conflict ofInterests: Representation of Interest Adverse to That
ofFormer Client, 55 B.U.L. REV. 61, 77-78 (1975). The disqualification of a former gov
ernment attorney not only protects government secrets, but also ensures that government
positions will not be utilized for private gain. Certain theories of disqualification, how
ever, such as "access to related information", may prevent an attorney from ever practic
ing in his area of expertise. In this context, the doctrine of ''vertical responsibility" acts
as a counterweight which limits the "access" theory. Id.
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are neither well formulated nor frequently used. 23 In United States v.
Standard Oil CO.,24 the court perceived the problem as an identifica
tion of the matters in which the attorney previously was involved
rather than as an identification of the government as the former cli
ent.25 The test is whether it was likely that the attorney previously
would have attained factual knowledge of the matter in contro
versy.26 This test, developed by Judge Kaufman,27 is a compromise
between the harshness of absolute attorney disqualification and the
need to protect the former client. 28 The difficulty with the Kaufman
approach is the degree of proof required to show factual involve
mentby the attorney while employed by the government. 29 One so
lution offered to overcome this difficulty is simply to presume the
existence of attorney-client confidentiality between all former gov
ernment attorneys and the federal government. 30
The second inquiry under DR 9-101(B) is whether the attorney
involved in the potential appearance of impropriety actually is em
ployed by the present plaintiff or defendant. Several disqualification
motions have been defended on the basis that no private employ
ment existed between the former government lawyer and the present
plaintiff. 3I Private employment, however, has been broadly inter
preted. It has been held that there is private employment irrespec
tive of the side chosen in private practice32 and that no fee
arrangement is necessary in order to establish a private employment
relationship.33 The courts, then, have given little credence to the
lack of private employment defense. Private employment should be
defined narrowly only if there is an actual appearance of
23. Woods v. Covington County Bank, 537 F.2d 804, 814 (5th Cir. 1976) (two
kinds of misconduct most prevalent are situations in which private representation calls
into question a lawyer's conduct while a public official and those in which a lawyer's
association with the government gives him an improper advantage).
24. 136 F. Supp. 345 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
25. Id. at 350-51.
26. Id. at 361-62. The comments to the Model Rules echo this factual approach to
"matter" and distinguish between direct involvement in a specific transaction and recur
rent involvement with the same issue for a client. ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY Rule 1-10 comment (Discussion Draft, Jan. 30, 1980).
27. 136 F. Supp. at 361-62.
28. Id. at 353-55.
29. Id.
30. Note, supra note 22, at 72. This presumption is better suited to the preliminary
stages than to an indepth factual showing.
31. E.g., General Motors Corp. v. City of New York, 501 F.2d 639, 650 (2d Cir.
1974); Telos, Inc. v. Hawaiian Tel. Co., 397 F. Supp. 1314, 1317 (D. Hawaii 1975).
32. General Motors Corp. v. City of New York, 501 F.2d 639, 650 (2d Cir. 1974).
33. Telos, Inc. v. Hawaiian Tel. Co., 397 F. Supp. 1314, 1317 (D. Hawaii 1975).
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impropriety.34
A third question in the disqualification analysis addresses the
problem of identifying precisely the matters within the knowledge of
the former government lawyer. The obvious situation arises when
the former government lawyer personally handled the government's
case. 3S The situation, however, is less obvious when knowledge of
the government's case is imputed to the attorney due to the basic
configuration of the government legal office. When an attorney is
responsible for a government office or subdivision, knowledge of the
proceedings undertaken by his juniors is imputed to him.36 Along
with this vertical standard of imputed knowledge, there also exists a
horizontal standard of imputed knowledge. This standard is applied
when two or more government attorneys of equal rank are in
volved. 37 The doctrine of imputed knowledge has been accepted
readily by some courts, and its application has resulted in the dis
qualification of former government lawyers. 38 One federal district
court suggested that the doctrine is relevant in large law firms in the
private sector. 39
There has been an undercurrent of dissent regarding adoption
of the imputed knowledge doctrine. The basis of dissent concerns
the public policy consideration against imposing undue restrictions
upon former government lawyers entering private practice. The po
tential severity of restrictions resulting from an application of this
34. But see Note, Legal Ethics-The ABA Code ofProfessional Responsibility-Dis
ciplinary Rule 9-101(B)-Former Government Allorneys and the Appearance ofEvil Doc
trine-General Motors Corp. v. City of New York, 16 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 651,
656-57,662 (1975) (phrase "private employment" should be interpreted so as to prevent
government lawyers from concentrating on cases which might provide future gain, which
DR 9-IOI(B) was intended to prevent).
35. See, e.g., United States v. Trafficante, 328 F.2d 117, 118-20 (5th Cir. 1964)
(attorney, formerly employed by the Internal Revenue Service who handled income tax
claims against defendants, disqualified from representing defendants in suits for foreclo
sure of liens for balance due on unpaid taxes); Allied Realty, Inc. v. Exchange Nat'l
Bank, 283 F. Supp. 464, 465-66 (D. Minn. 1968), qfJ'd, 408 F.2d 1099, 1100-01 (8th Cir.)
(attorney, formerly employed as Assistant United States Attorney who had participated
in the investigation and trial of three former employees of defendant bank, disqualified
from representing plaintiff in a subsequent action against the bank because he was utiliz
ing information previously acquired in subsequent receivership action), cert. denied, 396
U.S. 823 (1969).
36. See United States v. Standard Oil Co., 136 F. Supp. 345, 346 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
37. Id.
38. Porter v. Huber, 68 F. Supp. 132, 134 (W.D. Wash. 1946) (attorneys employed
by defendants in Price Administrator's suit disqualified under imputed knowledge doc
trine because they had been employed by the Office of Price Administration).
39. City of Cleveland v. Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co., 440 F. Supp. 193, 211
(N.D. Ohio), aJid, 570 F.2d 123 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 996 (1978).
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doctrine is obvious. 40 Therefore, continued use of the imputed
knowledge doctrine will depend on whether the possibility of harsh
results can be minimized through compromise. Perhaps realizing
this, Judge Kaufman delineated a more precise standard of imputed
knowledge that depends on the test of substantial responsibility as
determined by a quantum of connecting factors.41 The substantial
responsibility analysis is two-pronged: It requires an examination of
the lawyer's activities as a government attorney and a determination
of what knowledge may be imputed to him.
Determining a lawyer's activities as a government attorney and
what knowledge may be imputed to him are inseparable considera
tions; both concern the nature of the work performed while em
ployed by the government. Judge Kaufman addressed this issue in
General Motors Corp. v. City of New York.42 In General Motors,
New York City brought an action alleging that General Motors had
attempted to monopolize trade and commerce through the manufac
ture and sale of city buses in violation of the antitrust laws. 43 New
40. See generally Comment, Business as Usual· The Former Government Attorney
and ABA lJisciplinary Rule 5-105(lJ) , 28 HASTINGS L.J. 1537, 1540-43 (1977) (because
vertical responsibility test glosses over difference between the involvement and responsi
bility of a subordinate versus that of a supervisor, a more precise test should examine the
former employee to determine whether his responsibility in a matter in conjunction with
his personal involvement constitutes substantial responsibility). Rule 7.1 deals with the
problem of changing associations and subsequent vicarious disqualification due to client
confidence and/or adverse representation problems. The comments discuss the disad
vantages of per se rules of disqualification and endorse a "functional analysis." ABA
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 7.1 comment (Discussion Draft, Jan.
30, 1980). The two functions are to preserve client confidences and to avoid positions
adverse to a client. Although Rule l.ll(e) specifically addresses disqualification of the
firm of an already disqualified former government attorney, the comments to Rule 7.1
also are relevant since a "law firm" within this rule inc~),ldes a government legal depart
ment. These comments echo three significant points whii:l!: recur throughout the Model
Rules. First, preservation of client confidences is paramount. Second, switching sides in
any sense is forbidden. Third, in any analysis under these rules, the approach will be
thorough and factual.
41. Kaufman, supra note 12, at 665-66. Employees must be determined on an ad
hoc basis because whether information reached the attorney will vary from agency to
agency and job to job. Moreover, horizontal imputation of knowledge between depart
ment heads also must be determined by an ad hoc test based upon the likelihood of the
attorney receiving the information. Finally vertical imputation from subordinates to su
pervisory officials of work done by subordinates is absolutely essential to avoid the ap
pearance of evil. Id. The Model Rules incorporate the substantial responsibility
standard by requiring both personal and substantial participation of a public lawyer
before he may be disqualified. ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule
l.ll(a) (Discussion Draft, Jan. 30, 1980).
42. 501 F.2d 639 (2d Cir. 1974).
43. Id. at 641.
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York City retained George D. Reycraft as its attomey.44 A former
employee of the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice,
Reycraft had worked on a government suit against General Motors
alleging monopolization of the city bus business. 4s General Motors
moved to disqualify Reycraft from the case under DR 9-101(B).46
Judge Kaufman found that Reycraft had substantial responsibility in
initiating the government's antitrust claim against General Motors. 47
Judge Kaufman reasoned that because Reycraft had been assigned
to the case, had signed the complaint, and ultimately had become
Chief of Section Operations of the Antitrust Division, he held tech
nical responsibility for the case. 48
Judge Kaufman then sought to determine whether the present
action was sufficiently similar to the former government action so as
to be considered the same action. He found that the two actions
were the same because almost every act of attempted monopoliza
tion alleged in the private complaint also was alleged in the earlier
Justice Department complaint.49 Although Judge Kaufman's analy
sis was relatively solid, simply comparing the allegations in the re
spective complaints is insufficient to determine whether the actions
are similar. To establish an antitrust cause of action, well defined
44. Id.
45. Id. at 642.
46. Id. at 643.
47. Id. at 649.
48. Id. at 642. Compare Telos, Inc. v. Hawaiian Tel. Co., 397 F. Supp. 1314, 1316
n.11 (D. Hawaii 1975) (signing a complaint constitutes the exercise of substantial respon
sibility, except in rare circumstances) and Note, supra note 34, at 661-62 (as general rule
an attorney on the trial staff level who signs a complaint should be irrebuttably presumed
to have substantial responsibility for the matters contained therein) with Jordan, supra
note 9, at 201 (the appropriate perspective is the "rule of reason" which considers such
factors as office size, office location, and nature of the working relationships in evaluating
"substantial responsibility"). According to the Model Rules, the question would be
whether Reycraft had "personally and substantially participated" in the government suit.
ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule l.ll(a) (Discussion Draft, Jan.
30, 1980). It seems clear from the facts that he had so participated and, therefore, would
be disqualified. See note 41 supra.
49. 501 F.2d at 650. But see Control Data Corp. v. IBM, 318 F. Supp. 145, 147 (D.
Minn. 1970) (computer industry changed so completely in fifteen years that disqualifica
tion was not warranted); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Rio Algon Ltd., 448 F. Supp. 1284
(N.D. Ill.), rev'd in part on other grounds sub nom. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Gulf Oil
Corp., 588 F.2d 221 (7th Cir. 1978), and rev'd in part on other grounds and affd in part sub
nom. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 580 F.2d 1311 (7th Cir.), cerl.
denied, 439 U.S. 955 (1978) (when disqualification is ordered, the lines between the two
lawsuits are "patently clear" and the action usually involves the same documents or a
continuation of the same lawsuit); Telos, Inc. v. Hawaiian Tel. Co., 397 F. Supp. 1314,
1316 (D. Hawaii 1975) (finding present action to parallel earlier action because defend
ants were the same in both actions and the complaints were repeated verbatim).
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statutory elements must be satisfied by the plaintiff. 50 Consequently,
the causes of action, the complaints, and the discovery in antitrust
lawsuits will appear to be similar in comparable factual circum
stances. 51 This holds true for most lawsuits brought under any
closely worded statute. Thus, Judge Kaufman examined the actual
contents of the documents, rather than their mere facial
similarities.52
In any DR 9-101(B) analysis, the final inquiry is whether there
appears to be any incidence of impropriety.53 The appearance of
impropriety that concerned Judge Kaufman in General Motors was
the possibility that, as a former government lawyer, Reycraft's ac
tions as a public official might have been influenced, or appear to
have been influenced, by the hope of eventual private employment
wherein he could uphold or upset that which he had done while a
government attorney. 54 Thus, the ethical problem raised was "the
possibility that a lawyer might wield Government power with a view
toward subsequent private gain."55 Judge Kaufman concluded that
the appearance of impropriety was created because there existed not
only substantial responsibility, but also a plain overlap of issues and
a direct involvement by Reycraft in a similar suit while he was a
govern,ment employee. Based upon this analysis, Reycraft was
disqualified. 56
Courts have found that an appearance of impropriety may be
created in several other situations: When a former government at
torney gains an otherwise unobtainable advantage over an adversary
in a private suit;57 when an attorney who drafted or amended ordi
nances later attacks the constitutionality or validity of those ordi
nances;58 when a former government attorney, while still in
SO.

SOl F.2d at 650-51.
Id. at 651-52.
52. Id. at 652-55.
53. Id. at 649.
54. Id. at 648-49.
55. Id. at 650 n.20.
56. Id. at 642. See notes 40 & 48 supra.
57. See, e.g., Woods v. Covington County Bank, 537 F.2d 804, 817 (5th Cir. 1976)
(information advantage); Allied Realty, Inc. v. Exchange Nat'l Bank, 408 F.2d 1099,
1102 (8th Cir.) (court affirmed disqualification of attorney concluding that purpose of
Canon 36 was to prohibit attorney from gaining financial advantage through use of infor
mation obtained as a public official), cerro denied, 396 U.S. 823 (1969). The Model Rules
emphasize that the risk in this area is that public power and discretion will be used to
benefit the private client. ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule l.ll
comment (Discussion Draft, Jan. 30, 1980).
58. See, e.g., Traylor V. City of Amarillo, 335 F. Supp. 423, 425 (N.D. Tex. 1971)
51.
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government employ, investigated or had access to confidential
materials dealing with the lawsuit in which, as a private attorney, he
has become involved;59 and, finally, when a former government at
torney attacks either a contract that he drafted or the soundness of a
legal position that he asserted while in government employ.60
The focus of the courts has been toward factfinding in any ques
tion of appearance of evil. Even the series of tests outlined above are
factual inquiries. The only question of law is whether the factual
circumstances aniount to the appearance of evil. This question can
be answered only when the courts look to the purpose of DR 9
IOI(B): the maintenance of public confidence in the integrity of the
legal profession.
The Model Rules eliminate all questions of law and concentrate
solely on a factual approach. If there is "personal and substantial
participation" in a matter by a former government lawyer, that law
yer and all members of his firm are disqualified. 61 Although this
approach has the virtue of simplicity, it has not yet been shown
whether the addition of the term "personal" to Judge Kaufman's
substantial responsibility analysis will be fruitful. If the result is a
routine proforma analysis to determine whether the former govern
ment lawyer, for example, had signed the complaint, then nothing
has been gained. 62

B. DR 4-101(9)
The attorney-client relationship necessitates the exchange of
private thoughts; only then can the professional relationship truly
flourish and grow. Accordingly, most good attorneys demand com
(court disqualified city attorney who attacked constitutionality of condemnation ordi
nance that he had amended, defended, and enforced). See generally ETHICS COMM. OF
THE ASSN. OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, OPINIONS, No. 889 (1976).
59. See, e.g., Allied Realty, Inc. v. Exchange Nat'l Bank, 283 F. Supp. 464, 467 (D.
Minn. 1968), aJl'd, 408 F.2d 1099 (8th Cir.), cerl. denied, 396 U.S. 823 (1969) (court dis
qualified former government lawyer who had investigated and passed upon subject mat
ter of real estate transaction in prior criminal trials from acting as attorney for plaintiff in
subsequent civil action seeking to set aside claimed fraudulent mortgage); Hilo Metals
Co. v. Leamer Co., 258 F. Supp. 23, 27 (D. Hawaii 1966) (court disqualified former
government employee of the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice from acting
as counsel for corporation which sought damages for antitrust violations because attor
ney had access to documents related to the present case, had seen relevant confidential
material, and actually had investigated the subject matter).
60. See generally Kaufman, supra note 12, at 660.
61. ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rules 1.1 I (a) & (e) (Discus
sion Draft, Jan. 30, 1980). See also note 40 supra.
62. See note 48 supra.
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plete candor from their clients. With this "baring of the soul," how
ever, there is a corresponding danger of abuse. It is within this
context that DR 4-101(B) was designed to function. DR 4-101(B)
provides:
Except when permitted under DR 4-lOl(C), a lawyer shall not
knowingly: (1) Reveal a confidence or secret of his client.
(2) Use a confidence or secret of his client to the disadvantage of
the client. (3) Use a confidence or secret of his client for the ad
vantage of himself or of a third person, unless the client consents
after full disclosure. 63

The purpose of DR 4-101(B) is to protect a client from the mis
use of information acquired in a confidential attorney-client rela
tionship. The various canons and rules of the Code, however,
cannot be read in isolation. The ethical problems facing the former
government attorney, therefore, require an indepth consideration of
both Canon 9 and Canon 4. 64
An obvious appearance of impropriety is evidenced by the pos
sible misuse of confidential information. 65 It is reasonable to assume
that one of the functions of DR 9-101(B) is to prevent the appear
ance of a Canon 4 violation. This function poses a particular prob
lem for the former government attorney entering private practice. If
there is an appearance that confidential information was disclosed to
a government attorney during the course of his public service, he
runs the risk of being disqualified from handling a case in private.
practice in which disclosure of such confidences will be harmful to
the government as a former client and as a party in the pending
63. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(B) (1980). Under the
Code there are four situations in which a lawyer may reveal confidences and secrets of a
client: (I) When the lawyer has received the consent of the client affected after full dis
closure; (2) when disclosure is permitted under the Code or required by law or court
order; (3) when the confidence or secret involves an intention on the part of a client to
commit a crime; and (4) when disclosure is necessary to establish or collect a fee or to
defend the lawyer, his employees, or associates against an accusation of wrongful con
duct. Id. DR 4-101(C).
64. See Note, supra note 34, at 655 (most significant reason for existence of both
DR 9-IOI(B) and DR 4-101(B) is to prevent a breach of trust established to promote total
disclosure in the professional relationship).
65. See Jordan, supra note 9, at 191-92 (DR 9-101(B) founded substantially on the
principles of Canon 4 since the principal reason for disqualifying lawyers with respect to
former government matters is to prevent the misuse of client confidences); Comment,
supra note 40, at 1552. The comment to Rule l.ll endorses this view and cites Rule 1.7
("Confidential Information") and Rule 1.l0 ("Representation Adverse to a Former Cli
ent") as the significant factors in determining whether a conflict of interest exists for the
former government lawyer. See also ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUcr
Rule 7.1 comment (Discussion Draft, Jan. 30, 1980).
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suit. 66
While protecting attorney-client confidentiality and the appear
ance of a Canon 4 violation are strong public policies, they must be
balanced against the interest in avoiding interference with the cli
ent's choice of counsel. Once again, an equitable balance is neces
sary to retain public confidence in the bar. This confidence, for
example, may be eroded if disqualification of a chosen attorney de
prives a litigant of competent counsel needed for a just tria1. 67 The
solutions proposed to reconcile the competing interests in this area
are nothing more than forms of balancing that reflect the underlying
tension between the attorney-client privilege and the litigant's right
to freely chosen counse1. 68
It is logical to start an analysis of a client confidence problem by
determining whether the attorney-client relationship ever existed. In
the case of a former government lawyer this becomes an interesting
question, as the United States in toto was his former client. 69 The
commonsense solution offered by the commentators requires the
court to ask: Was the attorney a government employee and, if so,
what were his exact responsibilities?70
This question, however, is only the threshold inquiry. A party
moving for disqualification of an attorney under DR 4-101(B) also
must show that: (1) The previous attorney-client relationship is ad
verse to the present representation; (2) the subject matter of the two
relationships is substantially related; and (3) the attorney acquired
66. Novo Terapeutisk Laboratorium AjS v. Baxter Travenol Laboratories, Inc.,
607 F.2d 186, 189 (7th Cir. 1979); Black v. Missouri, 492 F. Supp. 848, 863 (W.D. Mo.
1980); ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, FORMAL OPINIONS, No. 342 (1975) (bal
ance necessary between the evils of misuse of government position and the government's
interest in the recruitment of well qualified attorneys).
67. Note, Ethical Problems for the Law Firm of a Former Government Allorney:
Firm or IndividuallJisqual!fications?, 1977 DUKE L.l. 512, 514 (attorney disqualification
does not increase public confidence in the bar when the primary effect of disqualification
is to interfere with choice of counselor to deprive litigant of competent counsel in com
plex area of law). See also Woods v. Covington County Bank, 537 F.2d 804, 812 (5th
Cir. 1976) (Canon 9 does not require absolute disqualification of every privately retained
attorney in a matter in which attorney had substantial responsibility as a government
employee).
68. City of Cleveland v. Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co., 440 F. Supp. 193, 195
96 (N.D. Ohio 1976), affd, 570 F.2d 123 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 996 (1978)
(noting the sensitive dilemma of protecting the attorney-client relationship without inter
fering with litigant's choice of counsel, court suggested an equitable balance as the neces
sary approach to the problem).
69. See Kaufman, supra note 12, at 665.
70. See Note, supra note 22, at 68, 72.
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confidential information from the former client.7 1 Although this ap
pears to place an extremely heavy burden of proof on the former
client, the presumptions working against the attorney are difficult to
overcome.
The central question in a DR 4-101(B) motion to disqualify is
whether the attorney involved in the present suit had access to confi
dential information in a prior, related matter. The classic case on
this point is T. C Theatre Corp. v. Warner Bros. Pictures. 72 T. C The
atre involved a motion by defendant, Universal Pictures, to disqual
ify Mr. Cooke from acting as counsel for plaintiff T.C. Theatre
COrp.73 The motion stemmed from the prior representation of de
fendant by Cooke in an antitrust suit brought by the United States. 74
In support of its motion to disqualify Cooke, defendant claimed that
Cooke's prior representation of defendant in the suit brought by the
United States and the present lawsuit both were based on the same
charges. 75 Defendant further alleged that Cooke, as plaintifi's attor
ney in the present case, would be proving the same charges against
which he had defended Universal.7 6 In this situation a presumption
71. Novo Terapeutisk Laboratorium A/S v. Baxter Travenol Laboratories, Inc.,
607 F.2d 186, 190 (7th Cir. 1979); City of Cleveland v. Cleveland Illuminating Co., 440
F. Supp. 193,207, (N.D. Ohio 1976), affd, 570 F.2d 123 (6th Cir. 1977), cerl. denied,435
U.S. 996 (1978). The Model Rules handle this problem of utilizing information of a
former client in a subsequent adverse relationship:
(a) A lawyer who has represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter:
(I) Represent another person in the same or a substantially related
matter if the interest of that person is adverse in any material respect to the
interest of the former client; or
(2) Make use of information acquired in service to the client in a
manner disadvantageous to the client, whether or not the information is
confidential as provided in Rule 1.7, unless the information has become
generally known or accessible.
ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.l0(a) (Discussion Draft, Jan.
30, 1980). This rule is narrower than DR 4-IOI(B) in two respects: First, it requires the
client's adverse interest to be material; second, it op(!ns up information once it is gener
ally known. These are constructive changes, especially the second point regarding the
government lawyer who works mostly with documents that are public under state and
federal freedom of information acts. See generally 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1976); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 4, § 7 (West 1976).
Rule 1.7 is the confidential information section most directly analogous to DR 4
101. Rule 1.10(2), however, applies directly to the use of client information in a subse
quently disadvantageous manner. See note 65 supra.
72. 113 F. Supp. 265 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
73. /d. at 266.
74. /d.
75. /d. at 267.
76. Id. at 268.
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arose that matters of confidence had been disclosed to Cooke.17 No
showing of actual disclosure was necessary.78 Cooke's argument
against the motion to disqualify was that defendant was required to
indicate the precise matters that had been disclosed to him.79 The
court agreed with defendant, stating that the former client need only
show that the matters involved in the two representations were sub
stantially related. If the former client can show substantially related
matters, the court will assume that there was a prior disclosure of
confidential matters relating to the present representation. 80
The substantially related test has been used in both the private
context and in cases involving government attorneys returning to
private practice. 8 ! The analysis in T.C Theatre has been merely
transplanted, with little doctrinal change, into a different context in
the government cases. 82 This shift of the standard, with no real dis
77. Id.
78. Id. at 269.
79. Id. at 268.
80. Id. See generally Jordan, supra note 9, at 193-95. In discussing the term "mat
ter" in the context of DR 9-IOI(B), Jordan concludes that a clear example of the same
"matter" would be any aspect of the continuation of the previous litigation. In a less
clear case, he advocates a broad definition of the term in light of the purposes of govern
mental integrity and favorable public opinion of DR 9-IOI(B). It is clear that this defini
tion of "matter" would be equally appropriate in determining the breadth of the
"substantially related matters" test. Another commentator suggests that the misuse of
confidential information is a specific form of an appearance of impropriety. Comment,
supra note 40, at 1552. Thus, the standard for determining an appearance of impropriety
is appropriately whether the attorney will be disqualified from handling a matter in pri
vate practice over which he had had "substantial responsibility" as a government em
ployee. Id See also ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.10
comment (Discussion Draft, Jan. 30, 1980) in which a lawyer's involvement with a spe
cific transaction of a client is distinguished from the recurrent handling of several generi
cally similar issues by a lawyer for different clients.
81. Fund of Funds, Ltd. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 567 F.2d 225, 235 (2d Cir.
1977); Black v. Missouri, 492 F. Supp. 848, 863 (W.O. Mo. 1980).
82. In Empire Linotype School, Inc. v. United States, 143 F. Supp. 627, 632
(S.D.N.Y. 1956), the court disqualified an attorney from representing a school with con
tract claims against the Veterans' Administration because the attorney had handled the
contracts involved in the litigation while an employee of the Veterans' Administration
Office. Although the court did not require the government to make a showing of actual
matters previously disclosed to the attorney, it did require the government to show access
to material "substantially related" to the present suit. Bul see State v. Brown, 274 So. 2d
381, 382 (La. 1973) in which an assistant district attorney previously had represented
defendant at an earlier trial for the same offense subsequently being tried by the district
attorney, the court presumed that the assistant district attorney had respected his former
client's confidences. The court, therefore, refused to impute knowledge to the district
attorney, demanding spec!ftc proof from defendant of actual disclosure by the assistant
district attorney.
The Model Rules treat this question as "one of degree of involvement" and ask
whether the depth of involvement was such that subsequent representation could be re
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tinction made between the special problems inherent in the public
bar versus the private bar, has been criticized. 83 The real contro
versy, however, involves the substantially related test itself.
One particularly valid criticism of the substantially related test
is that a presumption of disclosure of confidences based upon mere
proof of a former attorney-client relationship in a substantially re
lated matter is too stringent. 84 A strict application of the substan
tially related test not only will result in a presumption of disclosure
of confidences to the lawyer involved in the former attorney-client
relationship,85 it also will give rise to a presumption of disclosure
that is then imputed to that lawyer's present colleagues. 86 For exam
ple, if the former Chief of the Antitrust Division is presumed to have
had access to matters considered substantially related to the suit in
question, this presumption of knowledge may then be imputed to
other members of his firm. Some courts have rejected this strict ap
proach. 87 In addition, recently there have been suggestions regard
ing alternatives, such as an in camera proceeding in which the court
determines the content of the prior disclosures. 88
A need for an alternative to this trap of presumption and impu
tation clearly exists. A former government lawyer may view himself
as nothing more than a white elephant capable of disqualifying his
garded as a "changing of sides." ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule
1.10 (Discussion Draft, Jan. 30, 1980). See also id. Rule 7.1 comment.
83. See Kaufman, supra note 12, at 667. Judge Kaufman suggests that different
standards be used for government and private attorneys. Former government attorneys
cannot be held to the same rules of imputed knowledge from access to data which bind
private attorneys having definable clients and law firms. Rather, there should be a fac
tual showing of actual receipt of knowledge or a strong likelihood of receipt of knowl
edge. Id.
84. But see Novo Terapeutisk Laboratorium AjS v. Baxter Travenol Laboratories,
Inc., 607 F.2d 186, 191-92 (7th Cir. 1979) (once a substantial relationship is found, it will
be irrebutably presumed that attorney had access to confidential information).
85. Id.
86. Id. at 192-93.
87. In City of Cleveland v. Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co., 440 F. Supp. 193,
210-11 (N.D. Ohio), qlf'd, 570 F.2d 123 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 996 (1978),
the court noted that recent legal precedent has rejected the hard line approach of ir
rebutably imputing confidential disclosures, actual or presumed, between members of a
law firm. Moreover, the court rejected the mechanical application of the doctrine of
vertical responsibility.
The Model Rules effectively narrow imputation by rejecting per se rules of disquali
fication and requiring that the participation of the former government lawyer have been
"personal." See notes 40 & 41 supra. If this prerequisite is satisfied, however, the law
yer's entire firm is disqualified. See ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDuer
Rules 1.1 I (e), 7.1 (DiSCUSSion Draft, Jan. 30, 1980).
88. Note, supra note 22, at 76.
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entire firm. The likelihood of this occurring becomes especially
strong when the language of DR 5-lO5(0) and Model Rule 1.1l(e)
are considered.
C. Special Problems Related to the Application oj' Both
J)R 9-101(B) and J)R 5-105(J))
DR 5-lO5(0) provides: "[I]f a lawyer is required to decline em
ployment or to withdraw from employment under a Disciplinary
Rule, no partner or associate, or any other lawyer affiliated with him
or his firm, may accept or continue such employment."89
'The problem that DR 5-lO5(0) creates for the government at
torney is the automatic disqualification of a firm if one of the firm's
attorneys is disqualified under DR 9-lOl(B).90 The ABA Commis
sion on Professional Ethics recognized that the automatic disqualifi
cation ofa firm under DR 5-105 could discourage the recruitment of
former government lawyers by private firms because of the possibil
ity of subsequent firm disqualification. 91 To prevent this, the ABA
Committee decided that the court, or any other reviewing body, can
allow a waiver of the firm's disqualification if the facts do not consti
tute an appearance of impropriety and the government is convinced
that the firm will isolate the disqualified attorney.92
The success of the solution proposed by the Commission, there
fore, depends on the efficacy of the firm's screening procedure. The
courts will focus more on the firm's screening procedure than on the
facts themselves. 93 For example, in Kesselhaut v. United States 94 the
court was faced with a request for review of an order disqualifying a
private law firm because a member of the firm was a former attorney
for the government who had been disqualified. 95 The court noted at
the outset that the disqualification of an entire law firm because one
89. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-105(0) (1980).
90, Rule l.ll(e) handles firm disqualification in a similar manner and disqualifies
the entire firm of a disqualified former government lawyer. "If a lawyer is required by
this rule to decline representation on account of personal and substantial participation in
a matter, except where the participation was as a judicial law clerk, no lawyer in a firm
with the disqualified lawyer may accept such employment." ABA MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule l.ll(e) (Discussion Draft, Jan. 30, 1980). Rule 7.1 pro
hibits a lawyer who has left a law firm, including a government legal department, and his
subsequent associates from adverse representation or disclosing confidences. Id. Rule
7.1.
91. ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, FORMAL OPINIONS, No. 342 (1975).
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. 555 F.2d 791 (Ct. Cl. 1977) (per curiam).
95. Id. at 792.
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of its members had been disqualified was too harsh and should be
mitigated by an appropriate screening procedure. 96 The court then
focused on the screening procedure, which provided that the disqual
ified attorney would have no connection with the case through dis
cussions or documentary evidence. 97 Further, the procedure stated
that the files would be locked and the keys would only be given out
on a "need to know" basis. 98 Because the disqualified attorney was
isolated from the case, the trial court's order mandating firm disqual
ification was vacated. 99
The Kesselhaut court recognized that the purpose behind
screening is to establish and maintain a balance between freedom
and necessity.lOO The right of an attorney to practice law and the
right of a client to his choice of counsel are weighed against the need
to uphold and maintain the ethical integrity of the profession. lOl
The inherent flaw in screening, however, is that its success depends
upon the honesty and moral principles of individuals. Although this
self-policing frequently is successful, the efficiency of screening
might not be apparent to the public eye. 102 Nevertheless, the idea
behind screening is an appropriate alternative to the harsh result of
disqualification of an entire firm. As the public becomes increas
ingly aware of this, a more sophisticated form of screening will
appear.
D.

Other Matters of Concern to the Lawyer Leaving
Government Service
The former federal attorney should be aware of considerations

96. Id. at 793.
Id.
Id. at 793-94.
99. Id. at 794. But see Cheng v. GAF Corp., 631 F.2d 1052 (2d Cir. 1980), vacated
on other grounds and remanded mem., 101 S. Ct. 1338 (1981). In Cheng, complainant
alleged that a member of the defense firm was a former attorney in the legal services firm
presently representing him and had participated in case discussions with other members
of the staff. Id. at 1053-54. The court noted the existence of a "Chinese Wall," but
nevertheless disqualified the attorney because of the small size of the firm and the possi
bility of inadvertent disclosures. Id. at 1057-58.
100. 555 F.2d at 794.
101. Id. at 793.
102. For a useful analysis of the relationship between DR 5-105(0) and DR 9
IOI(B), see Comment, ProfeSSional Responsibility-Disqual!fication of Low Firm Under
DR 5-I05(D) Unnecessary Where Partner Who Had Formerly Been A Government Attor
ney Was Effectively Screened From Particpation-Kesselhaut v. United States, 12 SUF
FOLK L. REV. 189 (1978) (screening generally is effective but cannot eradicate every form
of impropriety because it depends on the integrity of the individuals involved and will
become ineffective if those individuals choose to disregard its constraints).
97.
98.
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other than those that have evolved, either directly or indirectly, from
the Code. First, there is the Federal Conflict of Interest Law,103 of
which three sections are of particular importance to the former fed
erallawyer. Section 203(a) of the Act prohibits government employ
ees from receiving compensation of any kind for services rendered in
any matter in which the United States is a party or has a direct and
substantial interest. 104 Although this section is more relevant to cur
rent government attorneys than to former employees, it reflects the
general thrust of the law and foreshadows the relevant Code sec
tions. Section 207(a) of the Act prohibits former government attor
neys from representing private parties in any matter in which the
attorney substantially participated while in government employ. 105
The same problems that apply in substantial responsibility under
DR 9-101(B) are encountered when trying to determine substantial
participation under section 207(a).I06
The last relevant section is section 208(a) of the Act. Section
208(a) provides that an employee of the executive branch of the gov
ernment or a governmental agency may not participate in a matter in
which a prospective employer has a financial interest. 107 Finally, the
former federal lawyer should be aware that federal agencies have
promulgated rules governing the appearance by former employees
before those agencies. lOS Federal courts have similar rules pertain
ing to justices and law c1erks.l09
III.

PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF A MOTION TO DISQUALIFY

A motion to disqualify should be made immediately after dis
covery of the facts that warrant apparent disqualification. Unless
such a motion is made, a party should be held to have waived the
103.

18 U.S.c. §§ 202-18 (1976).

104. Id. § 203(a).
105. Id. § 207(a).
106. See generally Jordan, supra note 9, at 197-202. (the objectives of the two pro

visions are almost identical, and courts and ethics committees have produced compatible
interpretations).
107. 18 U.S.C. § 208(a) (1976); see B. MANNING, FEDERAL CONFLICT OF INTEREST
LAW (1974); Jordan, supra note 9, at 174-89.
108. E.g., 16 C.F.R. § 4.1 (1980) (FTC); 17 C.F.R. §§ 200.735-8, 201.2(e) (1980)
(SEC); 29 C.F.R. §§ 102.119-.120 (1980) (NLRB).
109. E.g., SUP. CT. R. 7 (law clerks to justices may not practice before the Supreme
Court for two years upon leaving clerkship); 1ST CIR. R. 4 (one-year appearance ban).
See also Pilkington v. Bevilacqua, 632 F.2d 922, 924-25 (1st Cir. 1980) (attorney's fee
award by district court vacated and remanded for further scrutiny under a more rigorous
standard because attorney was former law clerk to awarding judge).
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right 110 because allowing a motion to disqualify to be brought at a
significantly later time would cause a great deal of anxiety to both
parties. III
Another general consideration is the Code itself. The Code es
tablishes the guidelines for the proper cond).lct of attorneys. Con
trary to popular notion, however, a violation of these guidelines does
not automatically result in attorney disqualification; this sanction re
sults solely at the discretion of the judge. 1l2 The party moving to
disqualify for an alleged conflict of interest must prove the following
facts: (a) That a past attorney-client relationship existed; (b) that
the subject matter of the attorney's former employment is substan
tially related to that of his present employment; (c) that the informa
tion received in the prior relationship was privileged; and (d) that he
has not waived his right to object to the present employment. 113
Proving these elements imposes a heavy burden on the moving
party. The courts frequently consider the subject matter relation to
former employment in disqualification motions. Most courts hold
that all circumstances must be examined. I 14 A necessary corollary to
this demand by the courts is the heavier burden of proof placed on
the moving party. Certain inferences simultaneously are available to
the party bringing a disqualification motion. For example, he may
use the inference that an attorney, formerly associated with a law
firm, has received confidential information that was transmitted by a
client to the firm. This inference, however, is capable of rebuttal. I IS
110. Central Milk Producers Coop. v. Sentry Food Stores, Inc., 573 F.2d 988, 992
(8th Cir. 1978) (appellants moving to disqualify opponent's counsel waived right to ob
ject because the motion was made more than two years after appellants knew that the
former government attorney, who had worked on a closely related case, had been hired
by plaintiff's law firm).
Ill. Id. at 992. For example, it may result in one party sitting on his rights while
the other plunges ahead with trial preparation.
112. Id. at 991. See also Lefrak v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 527 F.2d 1136 (2d Cir.
1975).
113. See note 110 supra and accompanying text as to waiver of right to object. For
a discussion of the evidentiary hurdles that must be met by the party moving to disqual
ify, see Note, supra note 22, at 66.
114. See notes 17-21 supra. See also Armstrong v. McAlpin, 625 F.2d 433,434 (2d
Cir. 1980) (en banc) (motions to disqualify involve factual determinations, such as
whether there is a threat of taint, whether screening is adequate, and whether a substan
tial relationship existed between past and present representations), vacated on other
grounds and remanded mem., 101 S. Ct. 911 (1981).
115. See, e.g., Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 518 F.2d
751 (2d Cir. 1975) (overruled on the question of applicability by Armstrong v. McAlpin,·
625 F.2d 433 (2d Cir. 1980) (en banc), vacated and remanded mem., 101 S. Ct. 911 (1981)
and Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, WI S. Ct. 669 (1981»; United States v.
Standard Oil Co., 136 F. Supp. 354, 364 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
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An order by a federal district court granting or denying a mo

tion to disqualify an attorney is final. This final order may be ap
pealed pursuant to 28 U.S.c. § 1291. 116 Although the actual appeal
procedure is relatively straightforward, the scope of appellate review
has been the subject of some disagreement. Aetna Casualty and
Surety Co. v. United States 1l7 is an example of the controversy.
Plaintiffs in Aetna argued that the scope of review of the appellate
court was limited to a determination of discretionary abuse by the
district court. liS The court rejected this argument on the ground that
the district courts are not necessarily better suited than appellate
courts to formulate and apply ethical norms. I 19 The court concluded
that an appellate court could determine whether the district court's
disqualification order was based on proper ethical considerations. 12o
It is clear that the appellate courts are dissatisfied with their
usual limited review in the area of attorney disqualification. J2J This
may be a healthy attitude, considering the serious public policies at
stake. 122 It is a dangerous practice, nevertheless, to have an appel
late tribunal second-guess the factual findings of a trial court. A re
view of the facts in the district court record is no substitute for the
116. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1976). See Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. United States, 570
F.2d 1197, 1200 (4th Cir. 1978); MacKethan v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 557 F.2d
395, 396 (4th Cir. 1977) (per curiam). In Central Milk Producers Coop. v. Sentry Food
Stores, Inc., 573 F.2d 988, 990 (8th Cir. 1978), appellee contended that an order denying
a motion to disqualify was not separately appealable pursuant to § 1291. The court held,
however, that the order was immediately appealable under the "collateral order" excep
tion to the finality requirement of§ 1291. See also Fred Weber, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 566
F.2d 602, 606-07 (8th Cir. 1977) (overruled on the question of appealability by In re
Multi-Piece Rim Prods. Liab. Litigation, 612 F.2d 377 (8th Cir. 1980) and Firestone Tire
& Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 101 S. Ct. 669 (1981», cert. denied 436 U.S. 905 (1978). But see
Armstrong v. McAlpin, 625 F.2d 433, 440 (2d Cir. 1980) (en banc), vacated on other
grounds and remanded mem., 10 I S. Ct. 911 (1981) (district court order denying a motion
to disqualify is not immediately appealable).
The issue of whether an order refusing to disqualify counsel is immediately appeala
ble under the "collateral order" doctrine was recently addressed by the Supreme Court.
In Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 101 S. Ct. 669, 676 (1981), the Court held that
orders denying a motion to disqualify opposing party's counsel in civil cases are not
appealable under § 1291 prior to a final judgment in the underlying litigation.
117. 570 F.2d 1197 (4th Cir. 1978).
118. Id. at 1200. But see Woods v. Covington County Bank, 537 F.2d 804, 810 (5th
Cir. 1976) (appellate court rejected the limited review of "abuse of discretion" and ap
plied the "clearly erroneous" test to issues of fact while carefully examining the ethical
standards applied by the district court judge).
119. 570 F.2d at 1200.
120. Id. See also Novo Terapeutisk Laboratorium A/S v. Baxter Travenol Labo
ratories, Inc., 607 F.2d 186, 188-89 (7th Cir. 1979).
121. 570 F.2d at 1200.
122. Id. at 1202.

220

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 4:199

findings of the district court judge in primus. The best approach is
one whereby the appellate court gives special consideration to the
factual findings of the district court, but still reviews the facts and the
legal tests under the "clearly in error" standard. 123 Finally, if sub
stantial doubt exists as to the possible creation of an appearance of
impropriety, these questions should be answered in favor of disqual
ification. 124 This approach is crucial because its application will help
to maintain the integrity of the bar.125
IV.

CONCLUSION

Former government lawyers may be accused of three different
kinds of improper behavior: The misuse of confidential information;
the treachery of switching sides; and the abuse of governmental
power for personal gain. 126 Balanced against these improprieties
are: The possible restraints on the government's ability to recruit;
the restrictions on the government lawyer's employment mobility;
and the possible deprivation of a client's choice of counsel. 127 These
factors are the common threads that run through consideration of
the ethical problems involving former government lawyers. All fac
tors must be weighed in light of the situation at hand and all the tests
are merely tools to aid in this process. The attorney involved in a
possible conflict situation should not always force the issue: Early
withdrawal from representation is preferable to a later, court-or
dered disqualification. 128
A more hard line solution can be found by resorting to DR 9
101(B). The approach under DR 9-101(B) suggests that no former
government attorney may accept private employment in cases that
were pending before his agency during his years of service. DR 5
101(D) would extend the attorney's disqualification to include all the
partners in his firm. As previously discussed, however, this ulti
mately would injure the public because qualified applicants would
123. See Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. ChrySler Motors Corp., 518 F.2d 751,
758 (2d Cir. 1975) (Adams, J., concurring) (overruled on the question of appealability by
Armstrong v. McAlpin, 625 F.2d 433 (2d Cir. 1980) (en banc), vacated and remanded
mem., 101 S. Ct. 911 (1981) and Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 101 S. Ct. 669
(1981».
124. Id. at 757.
125. Id.
126. Comment, supra note 40, at 1549.
127. Id. at 1556.
128. Note, supra note 22, at 83 (early withdrawal always is preferable to later dis
qualification because disqualification implies impropriety).
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be discouraged from entering government service. 129
The solution proposed by this article considers the facts of each
case before applying the rules of the Code. Unlike the hard line
approach, the final decision under these standards generally depends
upon certain factual inquiries made by the court. The balance that
this approach brings to the inquiry is preferable to an absolutist
view. As is the case in any factual determination with subsequent
application of legal tests, divergent results, however, are bound to
occur. 130
One pragmatic approach taken concerning ethical problems is
that of screening under DR 5-105(D). Under this procedure a gov
ernment agency would screen former employees before they would
be allowed to practice before that agency. Most commentators favor
screening over absolute disqualification,l3I but with the caveat that
the screening decision be made by a judge or an independent com
mittee.132 This is the preferable approach and it recently has been
endorsed by one federal court. 133 The problem of creating an in
dependent review committee without also creating a burdensome ad
ministrative procedure still exists.
In the final analysis, a balanced approach that gives careful and
thorough consideration to all the facts and circumstances represents
the best solution to the problem of attorney disqualification. This
inquiry is difficult, but the courts will do everything in their power to
be meticulous in this regard. Courts have always demanded, and
will continue to demand, lucid and cogent arguments from both par
ties. The courts then will apply the current ethical mores developed
to embody well proven judicial tests. There will be an inevitable
tension between the courts' traditional tendency to use well demon
strated and well proven precedent and their conscious attempts to
129. See Note, supra note 67, at 525-26 (exploring the possibility of total disqualifi
cation and noting that this approach would gready hamper government recruitment and
would impose substantial hardships on past and present government attorneys). See also
Comment, supra note 40, at 1547-48.
130. E.g., Comment, supra note 5, at 1043 (courts and agencies have difficulty as
sessing the substantial responsibility of a former employee because the party moving for
disqualification usually has difficulty producing !he extensive facts regarding agency pro
cedure and events necessary to ascertain !he former employee's responsibility in a mat
ter). See generally Jordan, supra note 9, at 193-201.
131. Note, supra note 67, at 529.
132. Comment, supra note 102, at 202.
133. Kesselhaut v. United States, 555 F.2d 791, 793 (Ct. Cl. 1977) (per curiam)
(screening procedure of law firm judicially endorsed). But see Cheng v. GAF Corp., 631
F.2d 1052 (2d Cir. 1980), vacated on other grounds and remanded mem., 101 S. Ct. 1338
(1981).
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keep the ethical standards current. If a correct decision is humanly
possible, it has the best chance of occurring in such surroundings.

